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Abstract
A state school system should be expected to reduce income inequality and
to make intergenerational mobility easier. It is therefore somewhat surprising
to observe that Italy, in comparison to the US, displays less inequality between
occupational incomes but a lower degree of intergenerational upward mobility not
only between occupations but also between education levels. In this paper we
provide evidence on this empirical puzzle and we o®er one theoretical explanation
building around the idea that even if in Italy moving up the social ladder is easier,
the incentive to move may be lower making mobility less likely.
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1 Introduction
An Empirical Puzzle
The Italian schooling system can be characterised as a prevalently centralised and public
system flnanced by the government through taxation, that provides the same quality of
education to everybody. The US system, instead, can be characterised as a prevalently
decentralised and private system in the sense that public education is mainly flnanced at
the local level and the share of students going to private school is substantially higher.
Given this characterisation, an Italian family at a low level of income (which can
re°ect a low level of acquired human capital) should have the same level of education
available as a higher income family. A US low income (and low human capital) family,
instead should have the additional disadvantage of a low expense in education decided by
parents (as a result of a lower direct investment or because of locational choices in com-
munities in which preferences are for lower tax rates and worse schooling institutions).1
Within this framework it would seem reasonable to predict for Italy a more compressed
distribution of human capital investments (and therefore of incomes) matched by a higher
likelihood of upward mobility for poor families.
Comparative empirical evidence on Italy and the US, described in Section 2, sug-
gests that this is not the case. While Italy seems characterised by less income inequality,
standard measures of intergenerational mobility between occupations and between ed-
ucation levels indicate that poor and non-educated families are less likely to invest in
the education of their children and to move up along the occupational ladder. In other
words, the Italian centralised public education system can be characterised as an ofier of
equal opportunities that surprisingly has not been accepted by the Italian poor families.
This is the puzzle that we would like to address and explain in our paper.
A Possible Explanation: the Role of Talent and Self Confldence
We propose a theoretical model which can shed some light on this empirical puzzle and,
more generally, on the relation between income inequality and intergenerational mobil-
ity.2 Our model builds on existing ones (in particular Glomm and Ravikumar (1992))
but adds an important element: people have talent, which is an essential requirement in
the acquisition of human capital. The consideration of talent is what makes the problem
of mobility interesting from an economic point of view: without mobility a society may
assign high talented people to low education groups, and people with low talent to high
1See Benabou (1996a).
2This relation has been surprisingly somewhat neglected in the literature. An important exception is
represented by the work of Anthony Atkinson (in particular, Atkinson, 1980-81 and Atkinson, 1983 who
takes up the challenge posed in Pen (1971) to \build a bridge between the ¯gures on vertical mobility
and income distribution". More recently, see also the model proposed by Galor and Tsiddon (1996)
in which, inequality and intergenerational mobility are positively correlated and driven by the pace of
technological innovations.
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education groups; this is an undesirable feature of an immobile society. 3
Talent is transmitted from father to son with some persistence and cannot be
directly observed. 4 The only test for talent is the performance at school. If someone
attempts to acquire education, and succeeds, he has a high talent; while, if he fails, he
has a low talent. Therefore, school as a sorting mechanism only works for those who
chose to invest in human capital. Since talent is imperfectly observable, each person can
only try to make some inference about it from the family history.
So the most important decisions, in particular those determining the investment
in human capital, are taken on the basis of the belief that each person has on his own
talent. The higher this belief, the more likely a person is to invest in education: in
fact we shall see that the rational decision is to invest in education if and only if the
subjective belief of having the necessary talent is higher than a critical threshold. We
refer to this as the self confldence factor, 5 although we have to remember that it is a
perfectly rational consideration, since this belief summarises all the information a person
has about his own talent.
This belief becomes an important way in which family background afiects the
decision of a child. A family may be stuck at low levels of education for a sequence
of periods because the previous family experiences have given to its members a low
confldence. Therefore, a fraction of the population has high talent, but does not use it,
because of the adverse belief. We say that a society is more mobile if a larger fraction
of the people in the low income group makes an efiort to increase personal income
through an educational investment. The key issue that we analyse in this paper is: which
institutional setup for schooling (centralised and public vs. decentralised and private)
makes a society more mobile in the above sense, and why. Given this characterisation of
mobility, it is desirable to increase it if one wants to reduce the probability that talented
individuals remain stuck with low human capital.
In a public school system in which a uniform education quality is ofiered to ev-
eryone, the combination of taxes and educational expenditures transfers revenues from
high income families to low income families, and makes a better education available to
the latter, at no additional cost. In a private school system a higher income makes the
choice of a higher education easier; so income inequality tends to persist. The tranfer
of resources induced by the state system and commonly quoted in its support, creates
indeed an important incentive for low income families to increase their human capital
and tends to raise the degree of mobility induced by public education.
There are however other factors, which go in the opposite direction.
3We are here speaking loosely on purpose: the full analysis of the implications of our model for welfare
and e±ciency is beyond the goals of the present paper. We think, however, that our model provides
the necessary structure for an interesting discussion of these issues, so far largely disregarded in the
literature on social mobility (particularly in the sociological contributions). We leave such discussion
for future research.
4Talent should be interpreted as the combination of the genetic and environmental transfers from
parents to children; so the assumption of persistence is plausible independently of any belief on genetic
transmission. As we will see, without persistence the problem of mobility becomes trivial and our model
features perfect mobility independently of the schooling system.
5A factor to which, surprisingly, Herrnstein and Murray (1994) devote no time in their book \The
Bell Curve".
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First, in a private system, a higher parental income directly increases the amount
of resources available for the education of the son, while it does not in a public system.
If people are altruists, this adds to the attractiveness of a higher education because one
knows that if the investment in human capital is successful he will be able to transfer
more resources to the next generation; in a public system, the educational transfer to
the next generation is centrally determined independently of parental income. Second,
a single tax rate may force some parents to a rate of expenditures in education lower
than they would desire, thereby making less likely an otherwise attractive investment in
education for their sons. Finally, the fact that the tax rate is unique makes useless any
information that a person may acquire on his and his son’s personal abilities, because
he cannot adjust the expense in education for the son according to this information.
Our explanation of the puzzle ofiered by the comparative evidence on education
flnancing and intergenerational mobility in Italy and in the US hinges on the role of
the factors outlined above. In principle, a centralised public system could ensure more
mobility than a decentralised private system if the redistribution factor prevails on the
others. But the main goal of our model is to show that the opposite outcome is also
possible for reasonable values of the relevant parameters. And the comparative evidence
on Italy and the US is there to motivate this flnding and to prove that it is not just a
theoretical possibility with little empirical value.
Of course in a more general model capable, for example, to incorporate the efiects
highlighted in Benabou (1996a) and (1996b), and in Fernandez and Rogerson (1996)6
the balance would probably be more favourable to the capacity of a centralised state
school system to increase mobility; but the basic trust of our paper would not change:
a public and centralised education system introduces distortions in a market economy
that societies are usually willing to accept, among other reasons, in order to reduce the
probability of leaving talented children stuck in low occupations; our empirical evidence
and our model show that this positive outcome is not a necessary consequence of a
centralised public education system.
Our model draws on the basic structure of Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), but adds
to it the consideration of mobility by focusing on the role of talent and self-confldence as
determinants of human capital investment decisions. This is an issue that they do not ad-
dress but that is crucial for an exhaustive comparison of the efiects of centralised/public
versus decentralised/private education systems. In their model the predicted mobility is
necessarily zero, since a dynasty which has an income higher than another in the initial
period has a higher income forever. The reason of the difierence is clear: in the model
of Glomm and Ravikumar there is no talent, persistent or i.i.d..
We, therefore, complement their analysis in a crucial way by showing under what
conditions a centralised state system, even if it reduces aggregate human capital accumu-
lation, may be desirable from the point of view of mobility, i.e. from the point of view of
reducing the probability that talented individuals remain stuck in low occupations. But
we also show that even this desirable property of a centralised public education system
is not granted in principle: under plausible conditions, such a system may be inferior to
a decentralised private one even from the point of view of mobility.
6See also the insightful survey by Bertola and Coen-Pirani (1995).
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After the description of the motivating facts concerning mobility and educational
institutions in Italy and in the US provided in section 2, in sections 3 and 4 we present
the model, the implied equilibria and the steady state distributions. In section 5 we
propose some unconventional measures of mobility suggested by the theoretical model.
In section 6 we describe and comment the results of numerical computations of the
possible equilibria under the two schooling systems. Concluding remarks follow.
2 Evidence on the Puzzle
Occupational Mobility
Social mobility is deflned and measured in many difierent ways in the literature. Among
economists, some authors focus on transitions between income classes or between per-
centiles of the income distribution (Atkinson (1980-81)) while others look at the speed of
mean regression of incomes across generations (Becker and Tomes (1986), Solon (1992),
Zimmerman (1992)); among sociologist, instead, the attention is concentrated on transi-
tions between occupations ranked according to social prestige (Treiman and Ganzeboom
(1990)) or on the transitions between social classes (Erickson and Goldthorpe (1992)).
In general while economists tend to study mobility in terms of incomes, sociologists are
more likely to focus on occupations.
Our approach can be characterised as a sort of intermediate third way that we adopt
partly because of data limitations7 but also because it ofiers some advantages from the
point of view of achieving a meaningful international comparison and complements in
an hopefully interesting way the existing literature. Sociologists have since long argued
that because of temporary income °uctuations and measurement error, mobility in terms
of yearly income is a misleading upwardly biased indicator of mobility if the goal is
to measure transitions between long term economic status. Casting this argument in
an econometric framework, Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992) propose averages of
individual incomes on subsequent years as measures of long term status, but we cannot
follow their suggestion because we do not have the necessary information for Italy. We
take instead a road more familiar to sociologists and focus on occupations as indicators
of economic status; but, we also depart from the sociological literature because we do
not rank occupations according to social prestige nor we aggregate them according to
subjectively deflned social classes.
Given the information contained in our datasets the concept of social mobility
that we can measure is represented by mobility between occupations ranked according
to the median income paid by each occupation in the generation of children in each
country.8 The reader should therefore keep in mind that in this study, a dynasty is
7See the Appendix 8.1
8We also performed our analysis using sociological indexes of prestige to rank occupations, but our
results concerning the relative performance the two countries in terms of occupational mobility does
not change. We present the evidence based on income ranking because it is less conventional from a
methodological point of view and because it allows for an analysis of the relation between educational
mobility and occupational mobility. Such analysis is impossible if occupations are ranked according to
indicators of prestige constructed on the basis of educational achievements.
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classifled as mobile only if the occupation of the son is difierent from the occupation
of the father. Take the case of a father and a son in the same occupation, which is
highly paid in relative terms when the father is observed but that is paid less than
average when the son is observed. According to our deflnition this dynasty is classifled
as immobile even if, in terms of individual incomes, it experiences downward mobility.
Income changes that take place within the same occupation but across generations cannot
be measured in our datasets and do not imply mobility according to our deflnition.
Viceversa, the case of a father and a son possibly earning the same incomes but working
in two difierent occupations is considered here as a case of intergenerational mobility.
Therefore, intergenerational mobility in this study has to be interpreted as mobility
between occupations even if occupations are ranked on the basis of incomes.
With this caveat in mind we begin our analysis with the evidence on inequality.
The existence of greater labour income inequality in the US in comparison to Italy, has
been already documented in the literature9 and is conflrmed in the datasets used in this
study: as shown in Table 2, within each generation all the most common indicators of
income inequality proposed in the literature are clearly larger in the US sample.10
Less documented, is instead the comparative evidence on intergenerational social
mobility for Italy and the US. Tables 4 and 5 present the matrices of transition between
occupational income classes deflned as proportions of equal size of the (log) difierence
between the highest and the lowest occupational incomes in the two countries (see table
3). According to this aggregation strategy, in each country these classes span over the
same percentage increase in occupational incomes. 11
Difierences between the two countries are apparent from the simple inspection of
these transition matrices: in particular, the probabilities of persistence along the main
diagonal are larger in Italy for the three upper classes. The fact that persistence in
the flrst class is instead higher in the US may be interpreted as evidence on the role of
\ghettos" in this latter country. But the probability to reach the two highest classes from
the bottom is higher in the US (37.7%) than in Italy (27.7%) while the probability of
persistence in the top class is higher in this latter country (47.3% against 38.7%). If one
computes on the basis of these matrices the most standard scalar indicators of mobility
that have been proposed in the literature,12 the US appear unambiguously characterised
9See, for example: Gottshalk and Smeeding (1995) and Erickson and Ichino (1994).
10For a description of these indicators see the appendix of the CEPR WP version of this paper
(n. 1466, October 1996). Given that in each country occupational incomes for both generations are
computed on the distribution of children, inequality di®ers across generations only because of changes
in the distribution of each generation across occupations.
11We obtain similar results with di®erent aggregation strategies, like for example the aggregation
based on quartiles of the occupational income distribution (see the CEPR WP version of this paper,
n. 1466, October 1996 ). We prefer the aggregation based on the income classes described in the
text because, given the skewness of the income distribution, quartiles (in particular the fourth) may
group together very disomogeneous occupational incomes. Therefore similar transitions in terms of
quartiles may mean very di®erent transitions in terms of occupational incomes. Furthermore, the focus
on absolute instead of relative transitions is consistent with the theoretical analysis presented in section
3.
12See: Boudon (1974), Atkinson(1980-81), Atkinson et al. (1981), Atkinson (1983), Bartholomew
(1982), Sommers and Conlisk (1979), Shorrocks (1978), Geweke et al. (1986), Conlisk (1989), Conlisk
(1990) and Dardanoni (1992).
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by greater intergenerational mobility (see Table 6). 13
In order to determine whether intergenerational mobility is signiflcantly difierent
in a statistical sense in Italy and in the US, we aggregate the four income classes deflned
above in two groups and we estimate a probit model of the probability that the son is in
the highest of these two groups. We deflne the highest group as the union of the classes
3 and 4 that were described in tables 3. Hence, the dependent variable of our probit
models takes value 1 if the son is in income class 3 or 4, i.e. if his occupational income is
greater than the income corresponding to one half the percentage difierence between the
maximum and the minimum of the distribution of occupational incomes. We estimate
this probability as a function of a dummy indicator for the income group of fathers (that
takes value 1 if the father is in income class 3 or 4) and of two dummy indicators for
the education levels of fathers and sons. In both generations and in both countries the
education indicators take value 1 if the individual has a college degree. Age controls are
also included in the regressions.
The results of this exercise are presented in table 7 that reports, for each regression,
the change in the probability that the son is in the highest group due to a change from
0 to 1 of each independent dummy variable.14 These efiects are evaluated at sample
averages. In model 1 only the family background variables are included as regressors:
while the efiect of father’s education is equal in the two countries, the efiects of father’s
income class is signiflcantly larger in Italy.15
In model 2 the education dummy for the son is introduced, and the efiect of fathers’
education disappears in both countries: this is a well known result in the literature16 and
suggests that most of the efiect of parental education on sons’ occupational achievements
works indirectly through the efiects on son’s education. The efiect of the occupational
income class of fathers, however, remains signiflcantly difierent from zero in both coun-
tries, and signiflcantly larger in Italy than in the US. While in the US the efiect of sons’
education is larger than the efiect of parental income, in Italy the opposite is true. To
put it more directly, in Italy it is better to ... chose the right family than to reach a
college degree.
Coming to the comparison between model 2 and model 3, in both countries a
likelihood ratio test rejects the hypothesis that family background is irrelevant. Yet,
while in Italy the value of the test (3 degrees of freedom) is 98.1 in the US it is equal to
38.1: i.e. the null hypothesis of no background efiect is rejected with greater confldence
in Italy. Furthermore, adding parental characteristics to sons characteristics (i.e. going
from model 3 to model 2) increases the predictive capacity (pseudo R2) of the model by
150% in Italy; in the US the increase is much lower being equal to just 19%.
The probit estimates presented in Table 7 conflrm that intergenerational mobility
between occupations is signiflcantly lower in Italy than in the US: in both countries
13For a description of these indicators, see the appendix of the CEPR WP version of this paper (n.
1466, October 1996).
14For the age controls the reported e®ect is the e®ect of an in¯nitesimal age increase.
15Here and for the rest of this table, di®erences between coe±cients have been tested using appropri-
ately constructed t-tests; the null hypothesis of equal coe±cients has been rejected with p-values smaller
than .001.
16See for example Treiman and Yip (1989).
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the occupational class of fathers is an important determinant of the occupational class
of sons, but in Italy the efiect is much stronger than in the US in absolute terms and
relatively to the efiect of sons’ education levels.
We turn now to the evidence on intergenerational mobility between education levels
in which the relative lack of upward mobility in Italy appears even more striking given
the prevalently public and centralised structure of the Italian schooling system.
Educational Mobility
The comparison across countries of educational mobility patterns is certainly not an
easy task given the enormous difierences between national education systems.17 One
strategy that seems to us reasonable consists in comparing the probabilities of reaching
the highest educational degree ofiered by the schooling system of each country. Disre-
garding post graduate studies, that both in Italy and in the US concern a very small
fraction of the population, we consider the college degree (laurea in Italy) as the relevant
highest educational degree.18 We therefore begin our analysis of educational mobility
by considering the probabilities of dynastic transitions between the following two edu-
cational categories: all the individuals without a college degree are classifled as having
low education, while those holding a college degree are in the high education group.
Table 8 presents the distribution across these educational categories in each genera-
tion and in each country. Italy is characterised in both generations by a lower fraction of
college graduates, but experiences the largest percentage shift towards higher education
from one generation to the other: while in the US the fraction of graduates increase by
69% in Italy the same fraction increases by 200%. Yet not all Italian dynasties shared
in the same way this greater opportunity to reach a college degree.
Tables 9 and 10 present, for Italy and for the US respectively, the intergenerational
transition probabilities between the educational categories that we have just described.
In Italy, the probability that the son of a graduate is a graduate is higher than in the
US (65.1% vs. 61.0%); viceversa the probability that the son of non-graduate reaches
a college degree is substantially lower in Italy than in the US (7.1% vs. 20.8%). The
inspection of these transition probabilities clearly suggests that the opportunities of
reaching a college degree are more unequally distributed in Italy than in the US, even if
Italy experiences a more substantial increase of the proportion of college graduates from
one generation to the other.
The odds ratios for the two transition matrices, reported in Table 12, show that
the odds of reaching a college degree are in Italy almost 25 times higher if the father has
a college degree, while in the US having a graduate father increases the odds only by
6 times. Hence, both countries do not ensure a situation of equal opportunities in the
transitions between education levels, but Italy appears to be more distant than the US
from such a situation. This is conflrmed also by the other scalar indicators contained in
Table 12.
17See Shavit and Blossfeld (1993).
18See the appendix 8.1 for a more precise description of the classi¯cation of education levels adopted
in this study.
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One might argue that a college degree means more in Italy than in the US in
terms of human capital acquisition. Indeed at least one additional year of schooling is
required in Italy to obtain a laurea and in some disciplines, like engineering or medicine,
the laurea involves educational curricula that in the US are required for post graduate
studies only. Therefore, as far as Italy is concerned, we provide evidence also for a
difierent classiflcation of educational categories according to which the high education
group includes all the individuals that have reached a high school degree or more.
Table 8 shows that with this alternative classiflcation Italy is characterised by an
even larger increase of the fraction of highly educated dynasties (262%); furthermore,
among sons, the proportion of highly educated individuals in Italy (high school or more)
becomes similar to the proportion of highly educated individuals in the US (college or
more).
Yet even with such a favourable classiflcation, the opportunities of reaching the
higher educational category are more unequally distributed in Italy than in the US (see
table 12). The odds of reaching a high school degree or more are now even larger if the
father is in the same educational category (the odds ratio is 27.3) and the distance from
a situation of equal opportunities increases with respect to the previous classiflcation
(see the indicator MT in table 12).19
Education in the two Countries: Centralization vs. Decentral-
ization
The evidence that we presented so far shows undoubtedly that Italy features more equal-
ity between occupational incomes but also lower intergenerational mobility in terms of
occupations and education levels. It seems fair to say that family background is a more
important determinant of individual social fortunes in Italy than in the US. These results
are apparently surprising given the centralised and public nature of the Italian educa-
tion system relatively to the US one. Such a difierent nature, that should have increased
the equality of educational and occupational opportunities in Italy, is clearly evident in
several aspects of the schooling institutions of the two countries.
A flrst fundamental difierence is that while both countries spend a similar fraction
of GNP on public education,20 the sources of public funding are very difierent. In
Italy, 79% of public expenditures for primary and secondary education comes from the
central government as opposed to local authorities, whereas in the US only 7.6% of
these expenditures is centrally flnanced at the federal level and as much as 44.7% is
flnanced instead at the local level (city or county).21 This is a crucial difierence from the
19Only the Bartholomew index of movementMB indicates more mobility for Italy with this alternative
educational classi¯cation, but this should not be surprising given that MB is an indicator of movement
not an indicator of equality of opportunities ( see the appendix of the CEPR WP version of this paper,
n. 1466, October 1996 ); its value is driven by the structural shift towards higher education that
characterised Italy in the post-war period, but it hides the existence of unequal opportunities.
20In 1990, the incidence of public expenditures for education on GNP was 5.2% in Italy and 5.3% in
the US; the ¯gures for previous years are slightly lower but similar in both countries. Data from OECD
(1995) and US Education Department (1995).
21Figures for 1992 taken from OECD (1995).
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point of view of this paper: in the US, independently of how much funding comes from
private sources, also public education should increase the role of family background as a
determinant of educational decisions because of the efiect of parental locational choices
in communities characterised by difierent combinations of local tax rates, housing prices
and quality of schooling institutions. As we have shown above, however, the role of family
background is instead surprisingly more important in Italy where education is not only
flnanced mainly out of public sources but these sources are also strictly controlled by the
central government.
In addition to this fundamental difierence, several other institutional features of
the two systems emphasise centralization in Italy and decentralization in the US. For
example, the age of compulsory education that is determined by a law at the parlia-
mentary level in Italy, while in the US is dictated at the state level, ranging between 8
and 13 years, with an average of 10.05 years and a standard deviation of 1.19 years.22
Furthermore, in Italy the types of educational curricula available in both private and
public schools are established by a parliamentary law at the central level. For each type
and level of schooling the parliament establishes also the subjects that have to be taught,
the outlines of teaching programs for each subject, the textbooks prices (for compulsory
education), the evaluation and grading methods and even the daily time of entrance and
exit from school and vacation periods. Therefore, for example, a parliamentary vote
is in principle needed to authorise a school not to teach a given subject or to teach a
difierent new one. At a difierent but still centralised level, the Minister of Education
issues approximately six hundred documents (circolari ministeriali) each year in which
additional instructions are given to teachers and headmasters with the precise goal of
making the education system as uniform as possible over the entire country. As a result,
for each level and type of school flnal exams are uniformly deflned, and in particular
for the highschool degree the written exam questions are identical for all students and
administered in the same day over the entire country. Note that also private school have
to obey these laws and regulations if they want to obtain legal value for the degrees that
they ofier. 23
The recruitment of teachers is also completely centralised in Italy, with uniform
requirements for each type and level of education: aspirant teachers have to compete
in national competitions and to pass similar flnal exams in order to be authorised to
teach (this happens also for university professors). The teacher’s salaries are centrally
determined on the basis of seniority and of level of schooling, with basically no room for
individually based difierentiations.
At the other extreme, the US public education system is far from featuring a
similar efiort aimed at centralising and making as uniform as possible any aspect of
the educational process. Where the US system comes closer to centralization is in the
requirement of standard uniform exams for admissions to higher levels of schooling. But
these exams are not imposed by any law and, paradoxically, they are probably the most
explicit indication of the degree of decentralization and difiormity of the educational
curricula ofiered by US schools.
22See law n.1859, 31/12/1962 for Italy and US Education Department (1995) for the US.
23See, for example, the Italian Law DL 297 16/4/94, \Testo unico delle disposizioni legislative vigenti
in materia di istruzione, relative alle scuole di ogni ordine e grado".
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The decentralisation of public education flnancing in the US makes the quantity
and moreover the quality of public education available to a child heavily dependent on
the locational choices and on the income of the family of origin. But in addition to
the possibility of choosing the quality of public education \with their feet", US families
have also the option of a well established private education system particularly at the
university level. The proportions of students enrolled in private schools in Italy are
8.1%, 7.8% and 3.5% respectively for primary, secondary and tertiary education; in the
US the analogous proportions are higher, being equal, respectively to 12.0%, 9.1% and
21.8%. The difierence is particularly striking for tertiary education.24 Furthermore, in
the US the proportion of public sources in the expenditures for tertiary education is only
56.2% (in 1991); analogous flgures for Italy are not available but given that the number
of private Italian universities can be counted on the flngers of one hand, we suspect
that the proportion of public funding for tertiary education is much higher in this latter
country.
Therefore in addition to the crucial efiect of the decentralization of public edu-
cation funding and regulations, the difierentiation of educational curricula in the US
is strengthened by the greater difiusion of private schools. It is of course di–cult to
measure how much the decentralization of funding for public education and the greater
difiusion of private schools result into an efiectively more disomogeneous quality of ed-
ucation provided by the US system. It may be indicative, however, to observe that
while the coe–cient of variation across the 20 Italian regions of the pupil-to-teachers
average ratios is 6.5% (for primary and secondary education) the correspondent coe–-
cient of variation across US states is 13.2%.25 The standard errors of (comparable across
countries) textscores for reading and narrative capabilities are respectively 3.4 and 3.6
in Italy and 4.8 and 4.9 in the US.26 This evidence, albeit certainly not conclusive, is
consistent with the view that the centrally funded and centrally administered Italian
public education system provides a quality of education that is more uniform than the
quality provided by the decentralised and more largely private US system.
In the following section we will show with the help of a theoretical model why
and how these institutional features of the two educational systems may explain the
difierent degrees of occupational and educational mobility in the two countries. Our
proposed explanation is certainly not the only one. In the Italian debate, for example,
it has been argued quite convincingly27 that barriers to entry/exit into/from certain
occupations might also explain the lack of mobility in Italy. The data currently available
to us are not rich enough to show, in a comparable way across countries, whether the
existence of non-competitive labour markets is the crucial factor driving the observed
difierences in mobility patterns.28 However, the existence of a prevalently public and
24Data for the US refer to year 93/94 and for Italy to year 94/95. See US Education Department
(1995) and ISTAT (1995).
25Our computations based on US Education Department (1995) and on ISTAT (1995).
26US Education Department (1995). Unfortunately similarly comparable ¯gures for mathematical
textscores, that would su®er less from the biases due to di®erent linguistical backgrounds in the US and
di®erent dialects in Italy, are not available.
27See Cobalti and Schizzerotto (1994) and Schizzerotto and Bison (1996).
28One piece of evidence o®ered by our data certainly points in this direction: while in the US the
probability of intergenerational persistence in self-employment is 20%, in Italy it is more than double,
being equal to 42%. On the relation between education an entrepreneurial activities in Italy see also
Barca and Cannari (1996).
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centralised education system in Italy should have at least partially compensated for the
lack of incentives to upward mobility induced by the labour market. On the contrary we
observe that also educational mobility (in particular upward mobility) is substantially
lower in Italy than in the US.
In the next section we suggest, that some intrinsic features of a public and cen-
tralised education system may cause lower intergenerational mobility independently of
the labour market. These perverse efiects have contributed together with the existence of
non-competitive labour markets to cause the existence of lower intergenerational mobil-
ity in Italy, particularly between education levels. Given the current world-wide debate
on the reform of public education we think it is important to highlight the possible role
of these undesirable features of centralised and public school systems.
3 The Model
Human Capital and Wages
Population is a continuum, each person lives for two periods and is productive only in
the second. His production depends on his human capital, which is described by a real
number h. He earns a wage equal to h. There are inflnitely many periods; in each period
t the distribution of human capital is denoted by Gt; the total human capital is therefore:
Ht =
Z
hdGt(h) (3.1)
The Technology for Human Capital
Each person has a basic working ability, of quality normalised to 1, and a natural talent,
which has no direct productive use, but is critical in acquiring additional human capital.
Talent is denoted by a 2 fL;Hg; it is transmitted from father to son with some
persistency. More precisely, talent follows a flrst order Markov process:
P (at+1 = H j at = H) = P (at+1 = L j at = L) = 1¡ fi
with fi 2 (0; 1=2). Talent is not always known exactly: we denote by ”t the belief that
the talent of the member born at t of the dynasty is H.
A higher human capital can be produced by the combination of a learning efiort,
the help of an educational system, and the direct or indirect contribution of the human
capital of the father. We assume that this is possible only if the talent of the person
is of the high type. The technology has (as in Glomm and Ravikumar (1992)) a Cobb
Douglas functional form. More precisely,
11
ht+1 =
(
1 if at+1 = L;
µ (1¡ nt)
¯ e°t h
±
t if at+1 = H;
where nt is the leisure enjoyed, et is the quality of education, and ht is the human capital
of the father.
Talent cannot be directly observed; the only way to determine it is to put it to the
test of the education system. If the person decides to go to school, and fails, then he
knows his talent was low; on the contrary if he succeeds he knows that it was high.
Preferences
The utility of each person depends on leisure of the flrst period, denoted by nt, consump-
tion of the second period ct+1, and a term which describes the expected utility from the
quality of the education which is left to the son. The expectation is taken with respect to
the belief ”t+1 that the person has on his son’s talent, which is not known with certainty.
Formally:
U(nt; ct+1; ”t+1; et+1) = log nt + log ct+1 + ”t+1 log et+1 (3.2)
The budget constraint of each person will depend on the institutional arrangement for
the provision of education: so we shall deal with it in the next section.
Two Institutions for Education Financing
As in Glomm and Rawikumar (1992) we consider two difierent possible institutional
arrangements for the provision of education, that is in the context of our model, for the
determination of the quantity et.
The flrst is a purely private regime, where et is decided by the father, and paid out
of his income. The second regime is a pure state school system. The quality of education
provided to each child is the same, and is decided as follows. A tax rate ¿ 2 [0; 1] is
voted in each period, and chosen according to majority rule. The tax rate applied to the
total income gives an amount spent on the collective education:
Et = ¿tHt (3.3)
We can now state the budget constraint formally. In the case of a private school system,
the individual is facing the two constraints:
nt • 1; ct+1 + et+1 • ht+1;
while in the case of the public school system, with tax rate ¿t+1, we have:
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nt • 1; ct+1 • ht+1(1¡ ¿t+1):
The Timing
The life of each person lasts for only two periods. A person born at date t knows the
history of attempts to get an education and of successes and failures of former members
of his dynasty. In the private school system, he also knows the amount that the father
has devoted to his education; while in the state school system he knows the prevailing
level of educational quality of the system.
On the basis of the history of his dynasty he now computes his belief on his own
talent, denoted by ”t.
29 He then decides whether to go or not to go to school, a choice
which is denoted as the choice between a Y or a N respectively. If he decides Y , he also
decides the amount of efiort he devotes to the learning activity. He then goes to school,
and this is the end of the flrst period.
At time t + 1 the talent of the person is revealed and ht+1 is determined. In the
state school system the tax rate ¿t+1 is then voted by the old generation. Then the
remaining income is consumed and taxes are paid, or, in the private school system, the
amount et+1 of funds for the education of the son is provided. Then the son is born and
the life of the older generation ends. Note that, to simplify notation, generations do not
overlap in this model, but in each calendar period both generations are alive: the oldest
in the flrst part and the youngest in the second part of the period.
To summarise, and to clarify the informational restrictions for the agents: the
decision about the education (that is, whether to go to school, and if so how much efiort
to spend in education) is taken without knowledge of the talent of the person; the vote
on taxes, the consumption decision, and the amount for the education of the son, are
decided after the additional information on the talent of the person has been obtained.
30
29Note that at the moment of deciding about schooling, each person learns about his talent from
his family history, but not from his performance in the early stages of his education. This is clearly
an extreme assumption. We have two reasons to defend it. The ¯rst is that some of the important
decisions about schooling are taken at the very early stages of the education. For instance, the quality
of the elementary education is important, and has sometimes decisive in°uence on future choices. The
second reason is that we can easily think of a richer model where, say, each agent makes successive
choices in education, and receives at each step a signal correlated with his talent from his performance.
This model would yield the same qualitative results as ours (provided, of course, that these signals are
not too precise). In other words, we want to focus here on the e®ects of past family experiences on the
choice of a person and we claim that our model and its results are robust to the introduction of the
possibility of learning from personal experience
30For a discussion of the paradox of voting within this framework, see the CEPR WP version of this
paper, n. 1466, October 1996.
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Learning about Talent
Consider a person with an initial belief ” on his own talent. If he decides to go to school
and he is succesful, he will change to 1 the belief on himself while the belief on the talent
of his son wil be 1 ¡ fi . After a failure in school, instead, these two beliefs will be
respectively 0 and fi.
If the person decides not to go to school, then he will gather no information about
his own talent and will have a belief
”^ · fi+ (1¡ 2fi)” (3.4)
on the talent of the son. We shall denote by ”^i the ith iterate of the function deflned
in 3.4; note that this function is increasing in ”, and its iterates converge to the value
1=2 independently of the initial value. Since, the belief of the flrst member that follows
a failure in school is ” = fi, the belief of the ith member of the dynasty not going to
school after a failure is: 31
f^ii · 0:5(1¡ (1¡ 2fi)i+1): (3.5)
The Optimal Policies
We begin with the case of the private school system. The optimal policy is decided by
backward induction from the second period, after the decision between Y or N has been
taken (and, in the case of a decision Y , the amount of leisure nt has been chosen). In the
second period we have therefore three possible cases: Y and a success, Y and a failure,
and N . In each of these cases the problem of the agent is to maximize for a given human
capital ht+1 and belief ”t+1 on the talent of the son:
max
(ct+1;et+1)
log ct+1 + ”t+1 log et+1; subject to ct+1 + et+1 • ht+1:
which has an optimal et+1 equal to:
”t+1
1 + ”t+1
ht+1:
and value:
(1 + ”t+1) log ht+1 + L(”t+1):
where the function L is deflned in the appendix 8.3.
31A similar learning process is in Piketty (1995) although in that model people learn about a parameter
that is social and not dynastic.
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So the optimal expense in case of a Y decision and a success is et+1 =
1¡®
1+(1¡®)
ht+1;
in the case of Y and failure we have: et+1 =
®
1+®
ht+1; and flnally, if the decision has been
N , and the belief on his own talent was ”, then: et+1 =
º^
1+º^
:
In the case of the state system, the important decision in the second period is the
one about voting, since consumption is a pure residual from income after payment of
taxes. The optimal tax rate ¿t+1 is
”t+1
1 + ”t+1
:
So in the three cases corresponding to the one described above for the private
system case we have: ¿t+1 =
1¡®
1+(1¡®)
; ¿t+1 =
®
1+®
; and ¿t+1 =
º^
1+º^
respectively.
We can now solve the problem of deciding in the flrst period the pair (Y; nt) (go
to school, with efiort nt), versus N . Leaving the details to the appendix 8.3, in order to
understand the optimal policies in the two systems it may be helpful to focus on three
generations, each one living for two periods: the grandfather, born at t ¡ 1, the father,
born at t, who is the agent whose two periods decisions are being modelled, and the son,
born at t+ 1. 32
In the private system the optimal choice of expenditure for education of the father
is a function of the father’s belief on the son’s talent, and of the father’s realised human
capital; we denote this function by eP
t+1(”t+1; ht+1). Furthermore, the father’s optimal
choice of Y versus N , and of efiort in school, is a function of the human capital of
the grandfather and of the avilable quality of education (decided by the grandfather);
we denote this function, that will have to be positive for a father to go to school, by
DPt+1(”t; et; ht).
Similarly in the state system, the optimal father’s vote on taxes is a function of the
father’s belief on the son’s talent; we denote this function with ¿S
t+1(”t+1). Furthermore,
the fathers’s optimal choice of Y versus N , and of efiort in school, is a function of the
human capital of the grandfather and of the average quality of education available to
the father in the state system, eS
t
: We denote this function, that will have to be positive
for a father to go to school, by DSt+1(”t; e
S
t ; ht).
33
Both functions DP
t+1(”t; et; ht) and D
S
t+1(”t; e
S
t
; ht) are crucial to determine mobility
in the two systems. A detailed discussions of this issue, and of the two functions, is
developed in section 5.
The Typical History of a Dynasty
To get some intuition about the way in which the model works we can follow the typical
path of a dynasty. After a failure in school of a given member, his son will have a belief
32Remember that in each calendar period two generations are alive, but they do not overlap: the
oldest lives in the ¯rst part and the youngest in the second part of each period.
33Note that in general the quality of education available to the father depends on the aggregate human
capital and on the median voter preferred tax rate in the generation of grandfathers, but in steady state
it will be identical for all generations.
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fi on his own talent and a human capital equal to 1. Now for a sequence of periods the
members of the dynasty will choose not to go to school because their self confldence is
too low.
During these periods, however, the belief on talent grows (by the fact that the
iterates of the updating rule 3.5 are increasing) until it reaches a critical level at which
the corresponding member of the dynasty decides to go to school. For convenience we
shall denote this critical level ”¤
P
in the private school system and ”¤
S
in the state school
system case. This critical level, or, equivalently, the length of this initial sequence of
periods will depend of course on the institutional arrangement and on the equilibrium;
we discuss later how to characterise it, and the various additional factors that in°uence
such critical level in the two systems.
In case of success in school and until a new failure occurs (in which case the cycle
we have just described starts all over again) the dynasty goes through a sequence of
better and better periods. In each of these periods the members go to school, acquire
human capital in an increasing quantity and keep the belief to a high level. In the private
school system the members devote an increasing amount of income to the education of
their children; while in the state school system they vote for large tax rates in support
of education. Eventually, however, a failure occurs and the cycle starts over.
4 Equilibria and Steady State Distributions
In this paper we shall concentrate our attention on the long run property of equilibria;
and they can be easily studied by considering the invariant distribution on the relevant
variables: human capital, beliefs over talent, investment in education and so on.
>From our previous discussion of the typical history of a dynasty it should be clear
that only certain beliefs over talent are possible in the long run, for a given critical belief.
Each dynasty experiences a failure with certainty over an inflnite time horizon. After
this, the belief of the member of the dynasty in the next generation over his own talent
at the moment of deciding about his schooling efiort is fi (i.e. the probability of being
difierent from his parent). The following members update their beliefs f^ik; k = 1; 2; : : :
using 3.5 without going to school until the critical level is reached. At that point the
corresponding member of the dynasty goes to school, talent is revealed and the belief
can only go back to fi (in case of failure in school) where the cycle begins again, or to
1¡ fi (in case of success); from this last belief the only transitions possible are either to
1¡ fi again (success) or to fi (failure).
If the critical level is above 1=2 there are countably many beliefs possible; if it is
below, then there are only flnitely many. In both cases, however, they are a subset of
the countable set ffi; f^i; f^i2; : : : ; 1¡fig. Note that, in turn, this will produce a countable
set of possible human capital level, and of possible expenditures in education and of tax
rates voted.
In order to examine the structure of the invariant distribution, the flrst step is the
deflnition of the appropriate state space:
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Deflnition 4.1 The state space of the process is the product space B £H = [0; 1]£R+
of beliefs over fH;Lg and of human capital values.
This state space has to be understood as follows. For the pair (”; h), ” is the belief of
a person on his own talent, at the moment in which he decides the schooling efiort n;
and h is the human capital that the same person has at the end of the schooling period.
34 The following Lemma describes formally the transition probabilities over this state
space: let i be such that the belief f^ii is the critical belief, ”¤P or ”
¤
S. Then :
Lemma 4.2 The transition probabilities over B £ H are as follows (wp means: with
probability):
† from (f^ik¡1; 1) to (f^ik; 1) for k = 0; : : : ; i¡ 1, wp 1;
† from (f^ii¡1; 1) to (f^ii; h0) wp f^i
i, and to (f^ii; 1) wp 1¡ f^ii;
† from (f^ii; 1) and (1¡ fi; 1) to (fi; 1) wp 1;
† from (f^ii; h0) to (1¡ fi; h1) wp 1¡ fi, and to (1¡ fi; 1) wp fi;
† from (1¡ fi; hj) to (1¡ fi; hj+1) wp 1¡ fi, and to (1¡ fi; 1) wp fi.
The above transition probabilities imply that, after a failure and if it does not go to
school, a dynasty moves with certainty across states characterized by a human capital
equal to 1 and by subsequent updates of the belief on talent. When the dynasty reaches
the critical level of self confldence it goes to school. Since the initial belief after a failure
is correct, the updated belief on talent is equal to the true probability of being talented.
Therefore, with probability f^ii the decision to go to school is succesful and h0 human
capital is accumulated; with probability 1 ¡ f^ii, instead, the member of the dynasty is
untalented and human capital remains equal to 1. If the dynasty keeps being succesful
no more updating is needed because each subsequent member knows to be the ofispring
of a talented parent. Therefore, with probability 1 ¡ fi the dynasty continues to be
succesful and accumulate increasing human capital, while with probability fi it fails,
human capital falls to 1 and the story starts all over.
The deflnition and the computation of the invariant distribution for these transition
probabilities is reported in the appendix 8.4. We discuss instead, in the next section,
how the probabilities in the transition matrix, and therefore intergenerational mobility,
depend on the type of school system.
5 Mobility
As we have seen, even on the reduced state space B £ H the transition matrices are
inflnite: so we have to flnd some simple index of the difierent degrees of mobility in the
34See the CEPR WP version of this paper (n. 1466, October 1996), for a proof that this state space
is a su±cient description of the process in the sense that the fact that a dynasty is in state x 2 X at
time 0 provides su±cient information to describe the future conditions of the dynasty.
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two educational systems. The simplest is the transition probability among two difierent
classes of human capital.
We divide the total population in two classes: those who have a human capital
equal to 1, the minimum value, and those who have a higher value. The flrst class will
be denoted by C1, the second by C2. We can then compute the transition matrix between
these two classes, say pij; i = 1; 2; j = 1; 2, where pij is the probability that a dynasty
transits from Ci to Cj; we have that:
Lemma 5.1 The matrix of transition probability across classes is:
Ã
(1¡ ®^
i
i+1
) ®^
i
i+1
fi (1¡ fi)
!
The term ®^
i
i+1
is a decreasing function of i.
The proof is in appendix 8.5. Note that ®^
i
i+1
= fi when i = 0.
The value of ®^
i
i+1
can be considered an index of mobility at the steady state equilib-
rium of the system: the higher this value the more mobile the society is. Note that it is
inversely related to the integer i, the number of periods a dynasty remains \discouraged"
after a failure. We summarise this as our
Deflnition of mobility: a society is more mobile, the shorter the period in which
a discouraged dynasty does not attempt to acquire education; that is, the lower the value
of the critical i (i.e. the lower the level of self-confldence needed to go to school).
We now turn to a discussion of this critical value and of how it is in°uenced by the
institutional setting for education flnancing.
Why Mobility Difiers in the Two institutional Settings?
The critical value of i is the flrst time after failure that the expected utility from a Y
decision is higher than the expected utility of a N decision. In the private school system,
for a father with belief ” on his own talent and available quality of education e, the
difierence between these two expected utilities is given by the function:35
Dp(”; e) · ”fl[1 + (1¡ fi)]L(
1
”fl[1 + (1¡ fi)]
) (5.6)
+”[1 + (1¡ fi)] log(µe°) + V (”) =
35This is the function that was introduced in the section in which optimal ¯rst period policies were
described. Here the human capital of the grandfather does not appear as an argument of the function
D
p, and analogously for Ds below, because it is equal to 1 for the critical generation.
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max
n2[0;1]
³
log n+ ”[1 + (1¡ fi)] log[µe°(1¡ n)¯] + V (”)
´
(5.7)
where the term V (”) is equal to:
V (”) · ”L(1¡ fi) + (1¡ ”)L(fi)¡ L(”^): (5.8)
and the function L is deflned in the appendix 8.2.
In the public school system, for the father with belief ” on his own talent and
available quality of education e, the difierence between the expected utilities of the Y
and N decisions is given by the function:
Ds(”; e) · ”flL(
1
”fl
) + ” log(µe°) = (5.9)
max
n2[0;1]
logn+ ” log[µ(¿H)°(1¡ n)¯] (5.10)
Mobility under the two systems difiers whenever, coeteris paribus, the flrst critical
generation i for which Dp becomes positive is difierent from the flrst critical generation i
for which Ds becomes positive. It is, therefore, crucial to consider how the two functions
difier for each given i.
One important difierence is that a public school system transfers revenues from
high income families to low income families and makes a better education available to
the latter at no additional cost. This efiect of a state system, that we label tranfer of
resources, is commonly quoted as the main reason for which public education shoud raise
intergenerational mobility.
But other factors, highlighted by our framework, point in the opposite direction
making it possible for a private system to induce more mobility. First a father in the
private system who decides his efiort in the production of his own human capital also
keeps into account the fact that in case of success the higher income available to him
will also afiect positively his son. In the public system instead a higher income will not
have this efiect, since the expense in education comes from a common fund, and the
contribution of each person to it is negligible. Coeteris paribus, this makes the value of
the Y choice higher in the private system, as re°ected by the coe–cient ”[1 + (1 ¡ fi)]
rather than ” in front of log ht+1 in the two expressions 5.7 and 5.10; and it increases
the efiort spent in education in the public system (as it is clear from the equations 8.14
and 8.17 in the appendix). We call this factor efiective altruism.
Furthermore, for a given i, the median tax rate in the public system is difierent
from the preferred tax rate according to which the critical parent would like to flnance
education for his son. In general the latter is larger than the former and this factor,
that we label rate of expenditure, tends to reduce the transfer of resources factor and the
capacity of a state system to increse mobility. 36
36 To see why, let's call the critical voter the voter in the public system whose son is the ¯rst agent
to go to school. We can compare his position to the position of the median voter. Observe that the
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Finally, the fact that in the public system the tax rate is unique makes useless any
information that a person may acquire on his and his son’s personal abilities, because
he cannot adjust the expense in education for the son according to this information.
Formally this efiect can be related to the presence of the term V (”) in the expression
for Dp; this term is instead absent in the expression for Ds because in the public system
the tax rates in the three events Y and a success, Y and a failure, and N are the same.
The opposite is true for a father in the private system as re°ected in the term V (”) in
the expression for Dp. We may call this term the value of information, which is due to
the information acquired by going to school versus not going. If he goes to school, the
father will know if his talent is high or low: hence he will know if the talent of the son is
more likely high (with probability 1 ¡ fi) or more likely low (with probability fi). If he
does not go, he will only have the information contained in his updated belief ”^. But the
function L in equation 5.8 is convex; so that we conclude that the value of information is
always non negative and therefore increases the desirability of human capital investment
in the private system.
We can now summarise our comparison of the two functions Dp and Ds, i.e. of the
factors that determine the critical decision to acquire human capital in the two systems.
We have seen four factors that afiect this critical decision. Three of them, the efiective
altruism, the rate of expenditure and the value of information, tend to make the private
school system more mobile. The flrst makes a higher income even more attractive for
the father in the private system, thanks to the direct positive efiect on the son. The
second induces lower mobility in the state system by forcing a common lower tax rate,
chosen by the median voter, on the critical voter. The third simply adds in the private
system an additional reason to go to school: acquiring information on talent.
On the other side there is the transfer of resources factor. This factor captures the
fact that taxation in public education systems transfers revenues from higher to lower
income dynasties, increasing the quality of education available to the latter.
While the transfer of resources factor is important and is usually quoted as the
reason for which public education systems should induce more mobility than private
systems, the goal of our model is to show that the other three factors may be relevant
as well. In the next section we compute numerical solutions of the model under the
two institutional settings and we prove that, for plausible parameters values, a private
education system may deliver more mobility than a public system if the technology for the
accumulation of human capital is such that the transfer of resources efiect is dominated
by the other factors. In our simulations we are therefore able to reproduce and explain the
puzzle ofiered by the comparison of education flnancing and intergenerational mobility
in Italy and in the US.
Before looking at these simulations, however, we have to deal with an important
special case.
proportion of unskilled is larger than half when i 6= 0. (The proof of this statement is in section 8.5.)
Then the median voter is always unskilled if i 6= 0; as a result the tax rate for the median voter is always
lower than the optimal tax rate for the critical voter.
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A Borderline Case
The support of the invariant distribution is a countable set. In the computation of the
median voter we begin to add from the lower tax rate, adding at each step discrete
quantities corresponding to the difierent types of voters. It may happen therefore that
one of these sums corresponds exactly to half of the voters. This is typically an unlikely
event; there is one case however that is particularly important, and requires a detailed
discussion.
Suppose that the critical i, i.e. the flrst time after a failure in which a dynasty
tries to go to school, is zero. In the invariant distribution there would be exactly half of
the population unskilled, with a most preferred tax rate equal to ®
1+®
, and exactly half
skilled, with most preferred tax rate equal to 1¡®
1+(1¡®)
. In this case the equilibrium in
voting does not exist.
In the numerical computations, we present however the results for the case in which
the critical i is zero, and the tax rate is equal to 1¡®
1+(1¡®)
. We think the values we present
are signiflcant for the following reason.
Consider an economy in which the value of the parameters are such that with i = 0
exactly half of the population prefers the tax rate 1¡®
1+(1¡®)
to the rate ®
1+®
. This is not,
at the corresponding stationary distribution, an equilibrium, because the proportion
of population voting for the higher tax rate is not strictly larger than half. Consider
however a path where the proportion of the population with human capital higher than
1 is larger than half, say „0. Along the path the values of aggregate human capital and
the distribution of human capital and belief converge to the values of an economy with
tax rate equal to 1¡®
1+(1¡®)
. The transition is the one described in the previous lemma 5.1;
so the fraction of population with belief higher or equal to 1¡fi is equal to „^0
n in period
n, a proportion strictly larger than half.
So along any such path, in every period, the economy is in an equilibrium in which
the values of average human capital, its distribution among the population, and so on
are close to the values that we report for the case of the critical i equal to 0, and tax
rate equal to 1¡®
1+(1¡®)
.
6 Numerical Computations
The goal of this section is to show that the model described in the previous pages may
generate two paradigmatic cases: one in which a private education system induces more
mobility than a public education system and one in which the opposite is true: both
outcomes are possible depending on parameter values. The set of parameters under
which the private system generates more mobility is such that the transfer of resources
factor is dominated by the other three factors described in the previous section. This
set can be considered as the one more likely to have generated the observed evidence
concerning Italy and the US: it is therefore interpreted as our explanation of the puzzle.
In table 13 we present the relevant indicators that describe the performance of
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each education system, in the two difierent paradigmatic cases. In both these cases the
parameter fi, that measures the persistence in the transmission of talent, has been set
equal to 0:1 while the scale parameter µ in the production function of human capital has
been set equal to 2:8.37 The two paradigmatic cases difier instead for the values of the
parameters fl and °. These parameters measure, respectively, the elasticity of human
capital accumulation with respect to efiort (1 ¡ nt) and with respect to the available
quality of education et.
Part A of table 13 shows that the main results of Glomm and Ravikumar (1992)
hold also in our model. In both Case 1 and Case 2, the state system features a lower
degree of inequality but also a lower total human capital (i.e. lower income) and a
lower total expenditure in education. The median income in the upper class, that is a
measure of inequality because income in the lower class is equal to 1 for everybody, is in
fact larger in the private system independently from ° and fl. The counterpart of this
greater inequality is the larger accumulation of human capital and the larger expenditure
in education that the private system can generate, thanks to the fact that fathers are free
to spend what they prefer for the education of their sons on the basis of their income and
their beliefs on talent. In the state system, instead, where the total quality of education
is determined by the common tax rate decided by the median voter and by the aggregate
amount of human capital, the total expenditure in education is lower. 38
However, as we argued in the introduction, the comparison between private and
public education systems cannot be limited to these performance indicators, as in Glomm
and Ravikumar (1992). A crucial aspect of the comparison is the relative capacity of
the two systems to generate mobility and to reduce the mismatch between talents and
education. While in the model of Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) this issue cannot be
addressed, here we have the elements to compare the performance of the two systems
from the point of view of mobility.
A common argument in defence of public schools is that they ofier a better quality
of education to poor dynasties that, in a private system, would otherwise spend too little
for the education of their children. The last column of Part A in table 13 conflrms this
intuition: the critical expenditure in education et, reported in this column, is what the
fathers of the flrst generation going to school spend for the education of their children.
Table 13 shows that in both Case 1 and Case 2 the state system ofiers a better quality of
education to this critical generation and this is an implication of the transfer of resources
factor that we mentioned in the previous section. The reader will recall that this is indeed
the factor that tends to favour mobility in a state system.39
37
Note that ® = 0:5 implies that the talent of the son is independent of the talent of the father;
therefore ® = 0:1 implies a relatively high inheritability of talent. We will mention later how the results
change in relation to the values of ® and µ.
38It is interesting to observe that the comparison between Italy and the US is perfectly consistent
with this latter prediction of the model: in 1992, the expenditure in education per student in the US was
equal to 3210 for early childhood education, 5600 for primary education, 6470 for secondary education
and 11880 for tertiary education. In Italy the corresponding ¯gures (in ppp dollars) were, respectively,
3280, 4050, 4700 and 5850. These ¯gures show that the expenditure per student in Italy is much lower,
particularly at higher levels of education. Also per-capita income is lower in Italy as predicted by our
model for a state system.
39Note that given that the population is normalised to 1, the total expenditure in education in the
state system is equal to the expenditure for each individual including the critical one.
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But, the reader will also recall that other factors point in the opposite direction.
Part B of table 13 shows indeed that the provision of a better quality of education to poor
families does not necessarily make the state system more mobile than the private system:
this because the ofier of equal educational opportunities to rich and poor dynasties does
not generate greater mobility if such an ofier is not attractive for poor dynasties.
The paradigmatic case in which the state system fails to generate more mobility
even if it ofiers a better quality of education to poor families, is Case 1 in which fl = 0:3
and ° = 0:1. Table 13 shows that in this case the probability of upward mobility is
higher in the private system (0:09 ) than in the state system (0:05). A greater level of
self confldence (i.e. the critical belief) is needed in the state system in order to go to
school (0:42 versus 0:18) and seven generations (instead of one in the private system)
wait after a failure without going to school before self confldence becomes su–ciently
high to try the human capital investment.
In this case the public ofier of equal educational opportunities is not su–cient to
ensure more social mobility because the relative weight ° of the quality of education in
the production function for human capital is too low. As a result the transfer of resources
efiect, that tends to increase mobility in a state system, is dominated by the other three
factors, mentioned in the previous section, that tend to increase mobility in a private
system: efiective altruism, the rate of expenditure and the value of information.
On the contrary, in Case 2, when fl = 0:1 and ° = 0:6, the quality of education is
so important for the accumulation of human capital that the public system is capable
to induce greater mobility: the reason is that this is precisely the situation in which the
public ofier of a better education to poor families makes the investment in human capital
convenient. In this second paradigmatic case, while the relative performance of the two
systems in terms of inequality, total human capital accumulation and expenditure in
education is unchanged (see Part A of table 13), no generation waits without going to
school in the state system because a belief of 0:1 is enough. In the private system instead
the level of self confldence has to grow up to 0:34 and 4 generations wait without going
to school. As a result the probability of upward mobility is 0:10 in the state system and
0:07 in the private system.
Increasing the values of the parameters fi and µ (that is, making the transmission of
talent more random and increasing coeteris paribus the accumulation of human capital
in case of success in school) makes mobility more likely in both systems but does not
change their qualitative relative performance in relations to the values of fl and °. This
is clear from our characterisation of the mobility matrix in section 5: when the talent of
the child is independent of the talent of the parent, this matrix has all identical rows,
irrespective of the values of the parameters and of the schooling system.
To summarise the results of our numerical computations, in order for the transfer
of resources factor to prevail, making the state system more mobile, two main condi-
tions have to be met. First redistribution of educational resources from rich to poor
dynasties has to be high enough to ensure a su–ciently better quality of education for
poor dynasties; and this is the common argument supporting the idea that state systems
should generate more upward mobility. But second, the quality of education has to be
relatively important, with respect to individual efiort, in the accumulation process for
human capital. This second requirement is what our paper highlights.
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The centralised and uniform provision of education to poor dynasties fails to gener-
ate mobility if the quality of education is relatively unimportant for the accumulation of
human capital. If this accumulation depends more on individual efiort (a large fl relative
to °), the ofier of equal educational opportunities is of little value for poor families. In
this case a private decentralised system in which parents are free to decide how much to
spend for the education of their children generates more mobility than a state system in
which poor families have access to a better education system but have fewer incentives
to do it.
In the light of this model, the lower mobility characterizing the Italian public
education system in comparison to the US private system suggests that individual efiort
is relatively more important than the quality of education in the process of accumulation
of human capital that characterizes these countries: the set of parameters described in
Case 1 is the set that appears to be most likely given the \two data points" ofiered by
the comparison.
7 Conclusions
If one of the goals of a public education system is to favour equal opportunities of
social mobility, the Italian schooling system failed to achieve this goal. The centralised
and public structure of education flnancing in Italy has indeed ensured a substantial
uniformity of the quantity and quality of education ofiered to both rich and poor families;
but despite this ofier of equal opportunities Italy, in comparison to the US, displays lower
intergenerational mobility not only in terms of occupations but also in terms of education
levels.
The fact that family background is a more important determinant of individual
social fortunes in Italy than in the US is particularly puzzling given that in the US a
large fraction of the expenditures for education is flnanced locally. From the viewpoint of
this paper this is the distinctive feature that makes the US education system intrinsically
private. Indeed, because of local flnancing (i) the quality of the education which is
supplied in the US is signiflcantly difierent according to the (perhaps implicit) price paid
for it; and (ii) the quality of the education provided to the child is decided by the parent
on the basis of this cost. In the US the quality of the pre-college education is signiflcantly
difierent in difierent neighbourhoods and it has an implicit price in the property tax paid
by residents and in the higher price of the houses in the best neighbourhoods. The choice
of the location of residence is clearly in large part a choice of the education provided
to the child. A fortiori for college education for which in addition to local flnancing,
US families have access to a large number of private universities. The fact that in such
a system family background is less important than in a system in which education is
centralised and public is the puzzle that this paper has addressed.
Our explanation of this puzzle starts from the consideration of self confldence as
one of the driving forces of upward social mobility. Self confldence has to be greater
than a critical value in order for poor dynasties to be willing to make an investment in
human capital. Poor dynasties coming from a history of failure or lack of investment in
education have lower self confldence and may not invest. As a result, a society may have
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in equilibrium talented people with low education.
Public education systems can be thought as being motivated, among other reasons,
by the goal of increasing self confldence in poor dynasties so that talented but poor
children may reach higher education levels and skilled occupations. The way to achieve
this goal is generally to ofier a uniform quality of education to all citizens, so that poor
families have the same opportunities of rich families to invest in the education of their
children. But our analysis shows that an ofier of equal educational opportunities may
not generate more mobility if the incentive to use education as a way to climb the social
ladder is low. Under plausible conditions, even if the quality of education ofiered to poor
dynasties by the state system is higher than the quality ofiered by a private system, the
investment in education may be more attractive for poor dynasties in the private system.
What makes an educational investment attractive in a private system is essentially
the possibility to use the outcome of this investments for the beneflt of future members
of the dynasty. In a private system the information on talent acquired in school can be
used to chose optimally the fraction of income to be left to the future generation in the
form of education, while in a state system this fraction is decided by the median voter;
in addition, in a private system, the higher income that one obtains in school in case of
success, beneflts directly the next generation because for a given rate of expenditure in
education of the father, the actual education quality received by the son is larger. These
factors tend to favour mobility in a private system, while in a state system mobility is
favoured by the redistribution of resources from rich to poor dynasties .
Therefore, whether a centralised and uniform education system induces more or less
mobility than a decentralised and private one depends on efiects pointing in opposite
directions. Our model shows that a state system generates less mobility when the quality
of education is relatively less important than individual efiort in the accumulation of
human capital. In this case, even if the cost of schooling is low in the state system, the
\dynastic" return to schooling is also low and the ofier of a better quality of education
to poor families has little value to them. This is instead the case in which a private
system does a better job in raising the \dynastic" return to schooling, thereby making
the investment in human capital attractive even for poor families.
Another way to look at the policy implications of our paper is to observe that
primary education is a process of human capital accumulation in which the quality of
education (as opposed to individual efiort) is relatively important: therefore a public
school system may induce more educational investment. On the contrary, tertiary ed-
ucation is a process in which efiort is relatively more important and the higher quality
of education ofiered to poor families by a public system does not compensate for the
lack of \dynastic" attractiveness of the educational investment. This could be the case
of the Italian public university system, whose uniform and low quality does not attract
the expected educational investment of poor families because it does not ofier a real
opportunity for talented children to emerge.
Our data are not rich enough to prove that the public and centralised nature of
the education system is the main reason for the low degree of social mobility in Italy
in comparison to the US: the existence of a non competitive labour market is certainly
an additional crucial factor. But we believe that our explanation is important if one
wants to address the policy issues raised in the debate on the reform of public education
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systems.
It looks like a paradox, but in a world in which family networks are important for
labour market success, a centralised and uniform quality of education, far from help-
ing poor children, takes away from them a fundamental tool to prove their talent, to
distinguish themselves and to compete with rich children, whether talented or not.
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8 Appendices
8.1 The data
As far as Italy is concerned, our data come from a national survey conducted in 1985
by a group of Italian universities: the Indagine Nazionale sulla Mobilit¶a Sociale). A
representative sample of 5016 individuals aged between 18 and 65 was interviewed on
their working life, their social attitudes and their family background. From this flle, we
extracted information concerning the status of the respondent in 1985 and his/her family
when he/she was 14. Therefore, while respondents are observed in the same year (1985),
their parents are observed in difierent years, ranging in principle from 1934 to 1981.
>From the original sample we excluded all individuals not belonging to the labour
force or whose occupation was unknown. In addition, for comparability with the US
sample (see below), we excluded all women and all individuals younger than 25; this
latter restriction is justifled by the fact that we want to allow for the possibility of
completing university curricula. With these restrictions the original sample reduces to
1666 son-father couples; their age distribution is reported in table 1. The average age of
each generation is similar and note that some parents were born during the 19th century.
US data comes, instead, from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), that
consists of a longitudinal sample of families interviewed for the flrst time in 1968 and
then followed on a yearly basis. The subsample that we use is an extract of the original
sample containing information on 1050 father-son couples, whose occupation was known
and whose age was greater than 25 at the time of the interview.
An important difierence between the two datasets is that US data are based on
direct interviews to both sons and fathers, while Italian data on fathers are based on
sons’ recollections. Information on US sons were collected in 1990, while information
on corresponding fathers refer to 1974. Because of the short interval between the two
interviews, US sons are on average considerably younger than their fathers as shown
in table 1. Although this feature of our data clearly generates a bias we believe that
this bias reinforces our conclusions. If Italian children are on average older, they should
have had more time to get rid of the efiects of an unfavourable family background.
Vice-versa, family background should be more important in the US where children are
observed earlier in their careers. This because we expect family networking to be more
important at the beginning of a career than at the end. Yet, even if the bias in the data
increases the likelihood of flnding family background more important in the US, we flnd
that it is more important in Italy.
In each country we consider the median income paid by each occupation as the
indicator of individual long term economic status. As described in the text, we then group
individuals in four classes constructed according to occupational income intervals. We
then study mobility tables describing the probability of an intergenerational transition
between the four classes.
It should be noted that we have not yet found a single classiflcation of elemen-
tary occupations applicable to both countries, nor a conversion table from the national
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classiflcations into a common international one. For Italy our data set is based on the
occupation classiflcation developed by DeLillo-Schizzerotto (1985), who grouped 13.000
elementary occupations into 97 basic groups, characterised by a similar degree of social
desirability (as measured by the ranking obtained in sample interviews). For the US, we
rely on the classiflcation scheme developed by Duncan (1961), who estimated an index of
social prestige (based on income and educational achievement) starting from a subgroup
of occupations whose social desirability was estimated through direct interviews. In this
case the classiflcation scheme include 96 basic groups. Therefore we have a comparable
number of occupational groups for the two countries, and these groups were created with
similar methodologies, namely on the basis of a homogeneous degree of social desirabil-
ity. But note that the ranking between occupations in the two countries does not need
to be the same.
As far as occupational incomes are concerned, for the US sample we have informa-
tion about the earnings of both generations. On the contrary, in the Italian sample, we
do not have any direct information about incomes. We therefore merged occupational
income data from another source according to the following procedure.
We started with incomes taken from the 1987 wave of the Indagine sui Bilanci delle
Famiglie Italiane run by the Bank of Italy. Since this survey reports net incomes, we have
estimated the corresponding gross incomes on the basis of the relevant flscal legislation
for 1987.40 We then estimated an earning function using gross incomes. Regressors in
the earning function were: age, 6 education dummies, 9 qualiflcation dummies, 11 sector
dummies and 5 geographic dummies. We used the estimated parameters to predict
incomes for the individuals in our main sample. >From these predicted individual incomes
we constructed the occupational ranking based on the median income of each occupation.
This procedure could of course be used only for the generation of sons. Therefore we were
forced to use also for fathers the occupational ranking constructed for sons. In order to
allow for a meaningful comparison, we imposed the same restriction on the US dataset
as well. But in this data set we have been able to check that the ranking of occupations
in terms of median incomes is fairly stable across generations: the correlation between
occupational incomes constructed on the distribution of sons and on the distribution of
fathers is equal to 0:78.
As far as the educational levels are concerned, we have classifled in the high ed-
ucation group all those individuals holding a college degree or a PhD degree in the US
sample, or having obtained a laurea or a dottorato di ricerca in the Italian sample. This
classiflcation corresponds to the UNESCO classiflcation ISCED 6 and ISCED 7, and
requires 18 and 16 years of school attendance, respectively in the two countries. People
who attended some years of college without obtaining any degree where not considered
as college degree holders.41 In the case of Italy we have also used an alternative classiflca-
tion scheme (see table 11): in this case we have included in the high education group all
those individuals holding at least a diploma di maturit¶a degree i.e. a secondary school
40The Italian system of personal income taxation is step-wise progressive and allows for tax deductions
based on household composition. It is therefore possible to reconstruct for each individual his/her gross
income starting from his/her net income. Note that preliminary versions of this paper have circulated
with evidence based on net incomes.
41Because of some missing information on school attendance among fathers, the number of son-father
pairs reduces to 1505 observation for Italy and to 1037 for US whenever the education of fathers is
considered in the analysis.
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degree corresponding to ISCED 5 classiflcation scheme; in such a case the minimum
number of years of school attendance is 15.
8.2 A useful function
The following optimization problem appears repeatedly in our paper:
max
y2[0;x]
log(x¡ y) + z log y:
Its solution is y = z
1+z
x, and the value is:
(1 + z) log x+ L(z); (8.11)
where we have denoted:
L(z) · z log z ¡ (1 + z) log(1 + z): (8.12)
In order to lighten the presentation, we often refer to this function in the paper.
8.3 First period optimal policies
We begin with the private school system. The agent born at t is comparing the maximum
between two quantities. The flrst is the expected maximum utility from the choice
(Y; nt) today, assuming that in the following period the agent will make the optimal
choice (of consumption and expenditure on education for the son) conditional on the
new information about his own and the son’s talent. With belief ”t on his own talent
the flrst choice gives a success with probability ”t and failure with probability 1¡ ”t. If
we substitute the values of the second period in the utility function 3.2 and write the
maximisation problem for the flrst period we get:
max
nt2[0;1]
lognt + ”t ([1 + (1¡ fi)] log ht+1 + L(1¡ fi)) + (1¡ ”t)L(fi) (8.13)
The optimal choice of leisure is
1
1 + ”fl[1 + (1¡ fi)]
(8.14)
and the value is
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”fl[1 + (1¡ fi)]L(
1
”fl[1 + (1¡ fi)]
) (8.15)
+”[1 + (1¡ fi)] log(µe°) + ”L(1¡ fi) + (1¡ ”)L(fi):
The second quantity we need to consider is the expected maximum utility from a
choice N today. The efiort does not afiect the human capital, so the optimal choice of
leisure is 1; the belief on the son will be ”^t, and the corresponding value has the very
simple form:
L(”t+1) = L(”^t) (8.16)
The reasoning in the case of the state school system is similar. The agent solves:
max
nt2[0;1]
log nt + ”t ((1¡ ¿) log ht+1 + (1¡ fi) log(¿H))
+(1¡ ”t) (log(1¡ ¿ ) + fi log(¿H))
where the tax rate ¿ is the prevailing tax rate (and not the tax rate chosen in the second
period by the agent). The optimal choice of leisure is
1
1 + ”fl
(8.17)
and the value is
”flL(
1
”fl
) (8.18)
+” log(µe°) + log(1¡ ¿ ) + [(1¡ fi)” + (1¡ ”)L(fi)] log(¿H):
8.4 The Invariant Distribution
In this section we provide the values of the invariant distribution over the state space
B £H, for a given value f^ii of the critical belief.
We denote by ƒ, respectively §, the transition matrix in the private, respectively
state, system; ƒ(x; x0) is the probability of the transition from x to x0. An equilibrium
invariant distribution is a probability F ¤ that reproduces itself, when each person makes
the optimal choice. More formally we say:
Deflnition 8.1 A steady state equilibrium distribution for the private school system is
a probability measure F ¤P over the product space B £H such that
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i. F ¤P = F
¤
Pƒ;
ii. each member of each dynasty is choosing efiort and school expenditure optimally,
according to the functions (DP ; eP ) of section 3.
Similarly we say:
Deflnition 8.2 A steady state equilibrium distribution for the state school system is a
triple (¿¤; e¤; F ¤S) of a tax rate, an average education quality and a probability measure
F ¤S over the product space of beliefs and human capital such that (FS;H is the marginal
of FS over H):
i. F ¤S = F
¤
S§;
ii. ¿¤
R
hdF ¤S;H(h) = e
¤;
iii. ¿¤ is the median voter tax rate for F ¤S :
iv. each member of the each dynasty is choosing efiort and vote on tax rate optimally,
according to the functions (DS; ¿S) of section 3.
The integer i is the only factor determining this distribution. Therefore, in an
invariant distribution, for each integer k = 0; 1; : : : ; i¡1 there is a corresponding fraction
pk of the population in state (f^i
k; 1), a fraction pi¡1(1¡ f^i
i) in state (f^ii; 1), and a fraction
pif^i
i in state (f^ii; h0). It is immediate from the transition matrix that:
p0 = p1 : : : = pi¡1 · p: (8.19)
It will be useful now to use the following notational device: the state (1 ¡ fi; 1j)
is the state of a person with belief (1 ¡ fi) in the flrst period of his life, coming after j
consecutive successes in his dynasty, and who fails at school. Now denote by qj and rj
respectively the fraction of the population in state (1¡ fi; hj) and (1¡ fi; 1j) we have:
q0 = pi¡1f^i
i · pf^ii; r0 = pi¡1(1¡ f^i
i) · p(1¡ f^ii); (8.20)
qj+1 = (1¡ fi)qj; rj+1 = fiqj; j = 0; 1; 2; : : : : (8.21)
But now observing that:
p =
1X
j=0
rj
we may write:
p0 + : : :+ pi¡1 +
1X
j=0
rj = (i+ 1)p
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but also:
p0 + : : : + pi¡1 +
1X
j=0
rj +
1X
j=0
qj = 1
and also from 8.21
1X
j=0
qj =
q0
fi
Using the equations above we get:
p(1 + i) +
1
fi
q0 = 1;
that we can solve to get flnally:
p =
fi
fi(i+ 1) + f^ii
; q0 =
fif^ii
fi(i+ 1) + f^ii
; q =
f^ii
fi(i+ 1) + f^ii
; (8.22)
where q =
P1
0 (qj) is the fraction of the population with human capital greater than 1
and (i+ 1)p is the fraction of the population with human capital equal to 1.
8.5 Proofs
Proof of lemma 5.1. Let F be an invariant distribution for the process described by
the matrix ¡. >From the ergodic theorem, the measure of the set of dynasty histories
with two consecutive values of 1 of human capital is given by:
X
f(º;h):h=1g
F (”; h)
0
@ X
f(º0;h0):h0=1g
¡((”; h); (”0; h0))
1
A :
>From our computation of the invariant distribution we derive that the above
quantity is equal to:
p(i+ 1)¡ 2pf^ii + qfi;
while the total fraction of population with human capital 1 is p(i+1): Taking ratios
and using the value for p and q in the appendix 8.4 we get the result. The proof for the
other row is obvious.
Recall now that f^ii = 0:5[1¡ (1¡2fi)i+1]; calculus applied to the function (1¡ (1¡
2fi)x)x¡1 proves the second claim.
Proof that the proportion of unskilled is larger than half when i 6= 0 (see
footnote 36).
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The statement is equivalent to (i+ 1)p > 1=2 which in turn is equivalent to:
f^ii
(i+ 1)fi
< 1
But f^ii = 1=2[1¡ (1¡ 2fi)i+1]; so this is equivalent to:
(1¡ 2fi)i+1 > 1¡ 2fi(i+ 1); (8.23)
Call 2fi = x and i+ 1 = n to simplify; and observe that
f(x) · (1¡ x)n
has derivative at zero equal to (¡n), and is strongly convex. Then since f(x) > f(0) +
f 0(0)x for every strongly convex function, and the above expression is exactly 8.23.
8.6 Numerical Computation
In this appendix we describe the procedure to compute the long run equilibrium. We
begin with the private school system. The procedure checks for each integer i if the
corresponding belief f^ii is the critical belief of an equilibrium distribution. Recall that
a critical belief is the least belief such that the member of a dynasty with that belief
decides to go to school.
In the previous section we have determined the steady state equilibrium proportion
of the population for the difierent beliefs. Note that there are several types of people
having the belief 1 ¡ fi; namely, those whose dynasty has had a sequence of one, two,
and so on successes. These types will have difierent level of human capital. We now
proceed to determine these levels and the corresponding proportions. Let us begin with
the flrst. After the critical level f^ii is reached, the member of the dynasty goes to school.
The father had a human capital equal to 1, a belief on his own talent equal to f^i(i¡1),
and has invested e = ®^
i
1+®^i
in the education of the son.
The son invests the optimal amount of efiort given these characteristics, and suc-
ceeds with probability f^ii. If he does, he has a human capital of
h0 = µ
Ã
f^iifl[1 + (1¡ fi)]
1 + f^iifl[1 + (1¡ fi)]
!¯ Ã
f^ii
1 + f^ii
!°
:
Similar arguments give that the dynasties with j consecutive successes in the past have
level of human capital that follows the difierence equation
hj = µ
Ã
(1¡ fi)fl[1 + (1¡ fi)]
1 + (1¡ fi)fl[1 + (1¡ fi)]
!¯ Ã
(1¡ fi)
1 + (1¡ fi)
!°
h
(°+±)
j¡1
for j = 1; : : :.
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We have conjectured so far that the integer i determines a critical belief f^ii. The last
step of the procedure is to verify this conjecture. If it is, we have found a steady state
equilibrium; if it is not, we proceed to the next integer. To verify the conjecture we have
to check that the belief f^ii is indeed the least one for which people go to school. But the
difierence in expected utility between the two choices Y and N for a person with belief ”
on his own talent, expenditure e decided by the father and human capital 1 of the father
is given by the function Dp. The flnal step is now obvious: flnd the least integer i such
that
Dp
Ã
f^ii;
f^ii
1 + f^ii
!
‚ 0:
The procedure to determine the steady state equilibrium for the state school system
is similar, and we provide here the main lines. In this case too we check if f^ii is the critical
belief of the equilibrium, for every i. Recall now that the preferred level of taxes only
depends on the belief of the father at the moment of voting. A simple computation
now determines the median voter in this population, and the winning tax rate ¿(f^ii).
Also arguments like the one given above give the human capital for generations with j
successes. The equations are now:
h0 = µ
Ã
f^iifl
1 + f^iifl
!¯
e°;
and
hj = µ
Ã
(1¡ fi)fl
1 + (1¡ fi)fl
!¯
e°h±j¡1;
for j = 1; : : :. The e in the formulas for human capital above is for the moment a
parameter to be determined. Keeping into account that the proportion of population
with h0 is pf^i
i, and the proportion of population with hj is qfi(1 ¡ fi)
j for every j > 0
we can now determine the aggregate human capital and therefore the aggregate income,
this last as a function of e (besides i), H(i; e) say. Now solving for e in
e = ¿(f^ii)H(i; e)
determines a value of the education quality level in the state school system e(i), say.
The flnal step is, as before, the determination of the integer i for which indeed the belief
f^ii is the critical level. The function giving the difierence between the expected utility
of the Y and the N decision, for person with father having a human capital equal to 1
is now given by: the function Ds, and as before we conclude by determining the least
integer i such that Ds(f^ii; e(i)) ‚ 0:
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Table 1: Age distribution for both generations in Italy and in the US
Country Father/son Av.age St.Dev. Min. age Max. age
Italy Father 47 7 31 83
N = 1666 Son 44 11 25 65
United States Father 47 7 27 74
N = 1050 Son 33 5 25 59
Note: Italian data refer to 1666 father-son pairs; sons were interviewed in 1985, and information
regarding their fathers refers to the year in which sons were 14 years old. Source: Indagine
nazionale sulla mobilitµa sociale. US data refer to 1050 father-son pairs; information on sons
refer to 1990, while information on fathers refer to 1974. Source: Panel Study of Income
Dynamics.
Table 2: Inequality measures for Italy and the US
Measure Italy US Italy US
Father Father Son Son
90-10 percentile difierential 140.6 164.3 131.5 150.3
relative mean deviation 12.2 14.6 13.2 14.3
coe–cient of variation 33.8 37.5 34.8 36.0
standard deviation of logs 30.0 35.6 31.3 34.9
Gini coe–cient 16.8 20.2 17.9 19.6
Atkinson († = 2) 8.7 11.8 9.3 11.4
Theil entropy 5.0 6.6 5.5 6.1
Note: All measures are expressed in % terms. Higher values imply greater inequality.
Table 3: Income classes for the United States and for Italy
US Italy
Minimum 100 100
Class 1 Median 130 135
Maximum 139 144
Minimum 148 150
Class 2 Median 174 164
Maximum 215 216
Minimum 215 219
Class 3 Median 261 234
Maximum 314 318
Minimum 322 331
Class 4 Median 337 369
Maximum 463 474
Note: statistics based on the distribution of sons' incomes; results are similar for the distribution
of fathers. Minimum occupational income normalized to 100. Income classes are de¯ned as
intervals of equal size of the (log) di®erence between the highest and the lowest occupational
incomes.
38
Table 4: Italy: interclass transition probabilities
Son C1 Son C2 Son C3 Son C4 Abs.freq.
Father C1 21.8 50.4 22.3 5.4 367
Father C2 12.0 55.9 25.8 6.3 884
Father C3 5.9 27.0 51.6 15.5 341
Father C4 4.0 16.2 32.4 47.3 74
Abs.freq. 209 783 510 164 1666
Note: each cell contains the row-to-column transition probability. C1-C4 are income classes
de¯ned as intervals of equal size of the (log) di®erence between the highest and the lowest
occupational incomes.
Table 5: US: interclass transition probabilities
Son C1 Son C2 Son C3 Son C4 Abs.freq.
Father C1 25.9 36.4 31.4 6.3 239
Father C2 22.5 37.7 29.7 10.1 337
Father C3 9.3 31.0 41.7 18.0 355
Father C4 4.2 15.1 42.0 38.7 119
Abs.freq. 176 342 373 159 1050
Note: each cell contains the row-to-column transition probability. C1-C4 are income classes
de¯ned as intervals of equal size of the (log) di®erence between the highest and the lowest
occupational incomes.
Table 6: Scalar indicators of mobility for interclass transition matrices
Italy US Eq. opp.
ML = 1¡ j‚2j 0.55 0.65 1
MT = k¡tr(P )
k¡1
0.74 0.85 1
MD = 1¡ jdet(P )j(1=(k¡1)) 0.79 0.90 1
MB =
P
i
P
j fijji¡ jj 0.62 0.80 -
MA =
P
i
P
j fijjWi ¡Wjj 22.44 27.55 -
Note: j¸2j is the modulus of the second greater eigenvalue; tr(P ) and det(p) are respectively
the trace and the determinant of the interclass transition matrix P ; k is the number of classes;
fij is the joint frequency in cell (i; j); the distance ji¡ jj is the number of class borders crossed
in the transition from i to j. jWi ¡Wj j is the percentage di®erence between median incomes
of class i and j.
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Table 7: Determinants of the probability that a son is in income class 3 or 4
ITALY US
model 1 model 2 model 3 model 1 model 2 model 3
Father in income class 3 or 4 0.37 0.35 0.22 0.19
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Father with college degree 0.18 0.02 0.19 0.05
(.09) (.09) (.04) (.05)
Son with college degree 0.31 0.39 0.47 0.50
(.05) (.05) (.03) (.03)
Father's age -0.001 -0.001 0.009 0.004
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.003)
Son's age -0.003 -0.03 0.005 0.007
(.001) (.001) (.004) (.003)
observed prob. .427 .427 .427 .508 .508 .508
predicted prob. .427 .428 .428 .511 .532 .530
Pseudo R2 .08 .10 .04 .07 .19 .16
log-likelihood -939 -918 -984 -665 -578 -597
sample size 1505 1505 1505 1037 1037 1037
Note: Maximum likelihood estimates of a probit model in which the dependent variable takes
value 1 when the son is in income class 3 or 4. The table reports the probability e®ects,
evaluated at the sample averages, due to a discrete change of each dummy independent variable.
For the age controls the reported e®ects are those of an in¯nitesimal age change.
Table 8: Actual marginal and limiting distributions for education in Italy and US
Italy Italy Italy Italy US US
E1 = no coll. E2 = coll. E1 = no HS E2 = HS+ E1 = no coll. E2 = coll.
Father 0.97 0.03 0.92 0.08 0.84 0.16
Son 0.91 0.09 0.71 0.29 0.73 0.27
Limit 0.83 0.17 0.30 0.70 0.65 0.35
Note: marginal and limiting distributions are referred to the matrices of educational transition
probabilities. Each limiting distribution is obtained under the assumption that the correspn-
dent matrix describes a Markov process. For Italy: high education = college degree in column
1 and high school degree or more in column 2; for the US: high education = college degree.
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Table 9: Italy: transition probabilities from \no college" to \college"
Son E1 Son E2 Abs.freq.
Father E1 92.9 7.1 1462
Father E2 34.9 65.1 43
Abs.freq. 1374 131 1505
Note: each cell contains the row-to-column transition probability. E1 = no college degree; E2
= completed college degree.
Table 10: US: transition probabilities from \no college" to \college"
Son E1 Son E2 Abs.freq.
Father E1 79.2 20.8 870
Father E2 38.9 61.1 167
Abs.freq. 754 283 1037
Note: each cell contains the row-to-column transition probability. E1 = no college degree; E2
= completed college degree.
Table 11: Italy: transition probabilities from \less than highschool" to \highschool or
+"
Son E1 Son E2 Abs.freq.
Father E1 75.9 24.1 1389
Father E2 10.3 89.7 116
Abs.freq. 1066 439 1505
Note: each cell contains the row-to-column transition probability. E1 = less than highschool;
E2 = completed highschool or more.
Table 12: Scalar indicators of mobility for educational transition matrices
Italy US Italy Eq. opp.
E2 = coll. E2 = coll. E2 = HS or +
OR = p12=p11
p22=p21
24.6 6.0 27.3 1
MT = k¡tr(P )
k¡1
0.42 0.60 0.34 1
MB =
P
i
P
j fijji¡ jj 0.12 0.27 0.14 -
Note:OR is the odds ratio; in a 2£ 2 matrix the indexes MT;MD and ML de¯ned in table 6
are all equal; tr(P ) is the trace of the interclass transition matrix P ; k is the number of classes;
fij is the joint frequency in cell (i; j); the distance ji ¡ jj is the number of borders crossed in
the transition from i to j.
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Table 13: Steady state performance indicators of the two systems
Part A
¯ ° School tax Median Total Total critical
System rate income human expenditure expenditure
upp. class capital in education in education
CASE 1 0.3 0.1 State 0.28 3.40 1.66 0.47 0.47
Private 7.30 3.19 1.37 0.15
CASE 2 0.1 0.6 State 0.47 2.52 1.69 0.80 0.80
Private 8.85 5.22 2.33 0.25
Part B
¯ ° School tax Proportion Probability Critical Generations
System rate of of upward belief without school
unskilled mobility after failure
CASE 1 0.3 0.1 State 0.28 0.66 0.05 0.42 7
Private 0.53 0.09 0.18 1
CASE 2 0.1 0.6 State 0.47 0.50 0.10 0.10 0
Private 0.60 0.07 0.34 4
Note: All the indicators are computed at the steady state for: ® = 0:1 and µ = 2:8. The
median income of the upper class is a measure of inequality in these economies given that all
the individuals in the lower class have an income equal to 1. Total human capital is de¯ned as
in equation 3.1. Total expenditure in education is the sum of what each father spends for the
education of his son in the private system, while in the state system is given by de¯nition 8.2.
The critical expenditure in education is the education available to the generation that goes to
school: it is equal to total expenditure in the state system becase of the the normalization of
population. The proportion of unskilled is equal to p(1 + i) as in section 8.4. The probability
of upward mobility is equal to the term ®^
i
i+1
in lemma 5.1. The critical beliefs are the beliefs
º
¤
P
or º¤
S
, respectively for the private and the state system, that dynasties have to reach after
a history of no schooling in order to decide to make an investment in education. The ¯rst
generation in school after a failure is the value of the critical i as characterized, for example,
in lemma 4.2.
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